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INTRODUCTION 
In 2006, two Malaysian courts, making determinations in cases involving Muslim women 
leaving Islam, came to contradictory verdicts. One court was the civil federal jurisdiction of 
the Malaysian Court of Appeals, and the other a syariah state jurisdiction in Negri Sembilan, 
applying hukum syara’ (the Malaysian version of Islamic law). The first of these cases, Lina 
Joy, is perhaps the best known Malaysian court case worldwide, involving a woman whose 
petition to have her conversion from Islam to Christianity recognised by the state, in order 
that she might marry her Christian fiancé, was denied on the grounds of her race. To be 
‘Malay’, according to Article 160(2) of the Malaysian constitution, is to be ‘a person who 
professes the religion of Islam, habitually speaks the Malay language and conforms to Malay 
custom.’1 The 2001 judgement on Lina Joy argued, ‘a person as long as he/she is a Malay 
and by definition under Art. 160 cl. (2) is a Malay…cannot renounce his/her religion at all.’2 
In the second case, Nyonya Tahir, decided later that same year, a Malay woman was declared 
shortly after her death by the Syariah High Court of Negri Sembilan to have left Islam, 
allowing her body to be released to her family for burial beside her Chinese husband in a 
Buddhist cemetery.3   
Studies of gender and justice have often shown that broad questions of constitutional 
law and the identity of the state tend to be fought over the lives and bodies of women. These 
cases about religious identity began as matters of the administration of everyday life – 
marriage, family life, death – then quickly became contests over a state’s control of the 
religious identity of its subjects, emerging as matters of apostasy and test cases of the 
religious identity of the Malaysian state itself.4 Yet explanations of these developments in 
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Malaysian law that emphasise the rise of Islam and Malay ethnocentrism often miss the ways 
in which institutional factors, in existence long before the putative ‘Islamic revival’, have 
functioned to construct particular visions of patriarchy in which ethnicity, gender and religion 
have intertwined to reinforce the ascendance of law as a vehicle for their enforcement. 
Gender emerges as a critical connecting strand among these three elements of law – 
the everyday, the socio-political and the legal-institutional. The argument here is 
emphatically not that adherence to Islamic law or aspirations to an Islamic state place women 
at a disadvantage; scholars of Islam and gender have long argued that Islam alone is no more 
patriarchal or oppressive to women than other religious traditions, and that the modern nation 
state has long surpassed these traditions in its patriarchy and interventionism.5 By tracing the 
process by which matters of personal status law became questions of apostasy in Malaysia, 
this article seeks to incorporate a discussion of the dynamics of gender within ongoing 
processes of legal and political transformation in South Asia. In particular, definitions of 
gender and their operationalisation in law emerge as particularly freighted by colonial 
baggage, in legal treatments of marriage and the family, but also in the ways in which courts 
reason the implications of categories such as personal status and their relation to other 
categories such as religion, race and custom. This article also seeks to question the way in 
which Malaysia might be properly understood as part of the South Asian legal landscape, 
through an emphasis on networks rather than on geography: on the one hand, the concept of 
personal status law, the common law citational practices of judges and lawyers, and the 
relationship between religion and state power might be understood to rely heavily on South 
Asian precedents, meaning that the treatment of gender in the courts of Malaysia needs to be 
understood in the context of South Asian constructions. On the other hand, judges and 
lawyers in Malaysia are increasingly referring to Islamic texts from the Arab world, and 
invoking legal discourses from the United States and United Kingdom, indicating a shift 
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away from South Asian legal and discursive frames. An awareness of these citational and 
referential shifts matters for research into the effects of a shared colonial past and legal 
system among the states of South and Southeast Asia; recognising the importance of 
citational networks may also help us consider how contemporary reconfigurations of 
educational, legal and professional networks in the Muslim world will shape the reasoning of 
courts and legal actors in decades to come. 
This article traces the overlap of colonial legacies, legal pluralism, jurisdictional 
struggle, national politics and legal activism that produced the divergent cases with which we 
began. The paper trails of the cases discussed here stretch back into the 1980s and 1990s and 
are representative of a trajectory of changes in Malaysian treatments of the question of race, 
religion and gender. Yet they also map, through citation, an evolving network of reference 
points within Malaysian legal institutions for the arbitration of questions of Islamic and 
constitutional law. Against the backdrop of a historical discussion on the ways in which 
personal status laws have come to govern the limited realm of family law, these cases reveal 
the traces of new networks of training, scholarship and citational practice in Malaysia since 
the 2000s, indexing the changing meaning and place of gender, women and the family 
through an evolving global network of reference and citation, whose nodes no longer end in 
Calcutta and London, but stretch to Damascus, Cairo and Washington D.C., and whose 
appearance is mediated through the Malaysian experience. Through these citational practices, 
this article explores how Malaysian judges, lawyers and legal activists are re-constituting the 
Muslim woman, her place in the Malaysian family, and her importance in efforts to articulate 
Islam’s place in Malaysian law. 
 
GENDER AND JUSTICE IN THE COMMON LAW: SOUTH ASIAN 
TRANSLATIONS 
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The concept of ‘personal status’, its expression in common law, and its connection to the idea 
of a discrete Muslim community and identity, trace their origins to the British experiment in 
India. Both Malaysian cases have long personal genealogies – the Nyonya Tahir question, 
involving a woman whose status as a Muslim was determined after her death in 2006, first 
came to the attention of the Negri Sembilan authorities in the mid-1980s, and the Lina Joy 
matter, involving a woman who wished to register a change in her religious status from 
Muslim to Christian, began with the plaintiff’s conversion in the 1990s.  Their institutional 
genealogies stretch far beyond these beginnings, to the imperial construction of personal 
status law and its application, in British imperial governance, based on newly rigidified 
categories of religion, and to the parallel construction of a domain of autonomy reserved for 
local Muslim authorities, based on newly reified understandings of Islamic law.6 Through 
these constructions, the authority and independence of local Muslim elites would overlap 
with a newly constrained but increasingly symbolic domain allowed to Islam – marriage, 
family, and ritual observance. Generally, studies of family and religious law tend to take the 
category of ‘personal status’ for granted, as pertaining to matters of family, gender and 
religious observance, in which the personal laws of Hindus, Muslims and others would differ 
in their details but not their scope or arena of enforcement. This is an assumption that 
deserves more careful de-construction, since the category of personal status was itself a 
construction of imperial and colonial law, and the equivalence between Muslim, Hindu and 
other personal law jurisdictions an outcome of multiple colonial experiments in the 
nineteenth and early twentieth century.7 Among the most influential experimental sites for 
the elaboration of personal law jurisdictions were the British courts in India, that helped 
determine the scope, content and logic of personal law for Muslims throughout territories 
under British direct and indirect rule. 
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 British-trained Muslim lawyers and judges in India played a crucial role in the 
making of personal status law throughout the British imperial system.  In the late nineteenth 
century, their activities in the courts of British India and in the political negotiations between 
Indian Muslim elites and the government of India helped to refashion a colonial legal 
construction – ‘personal law,’ whose application differed according to the religious status of 
a subject – into a site for the articulation of distinct Muslim and Hindu ‘community’ 
interests.8 Assumptions made by East India Company officials in the Hastings Plan of 1772 – 
that ‘Muslim law’ would be applied to Muslims ‘in all suits regarding inheritance, marriage, 
caste, and other religious usages or institutions’9 – would by the end of the nineteenth century 
become part of the construction of a domain of ‘Muslim personal law’ that Indian Muslims 
would defend as authentic and privileged. Throughout the Muslim world, Muslims grappling 
with the encroachment of European law and the intervention of colonial states would defend 
the territory of inheritance, marriage, and family as a sacrosanct domain, despite the lack of 
such precedent in earlier Muslim systems of law and governance. In Egypt, for example, the 
Arabic formulation of ‘personal status’ appeared in the title of a codification of Hanafi laws 
relating to the family, tying together the concept of personal status, family law, and the 
shari’ah, through the logic of modernising and reforming the law.10 This project also 
involved the spatial and hierarchical reassignment of the family to the private sphere, a 
process not restricted to colonial sites: Foucault, speaking of legal reform in France, observed 
that ‘thanks to the civil code the family preserved the schemas of sovereignty: domination, 
membership, bonds of suzerainty, etcetera, but it limited them to the relationships between 
men and women and parents and children...It constituted an alveolus of sovereignty through 
the game by which individual singularities are fixed to disciplinary apparatuses.’11 Talal 
Asad, tracing the ‘secularisation of Islamic law’ in Egypt in the nineteenth century, also 
pointed to the parallel privatisation of Islam and the family through the mechanisms of law: 
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‘the family is the unit of ‘society’ in which the individual is physically and morally 
reproduced, and has his or her primary experience as a ‘private’ being. The secular formula 
of privatizing ‘religion’ is adhered to by confining the shari’a to the family.’12 
 Indian Muslim judges working in the colonial legal system in the late nineteenth 
century sought to define Islam and Muslim practice in terms legible to the British; through 
court cases and the institution of precedent, articulated Islam in India in comparison to 
Anglican Christianity in ways that established their cognate character. By doing so, they 
helped to further an understanding of Islam as part of private life, and Islamic law as 
belonging to the domain of the ritual and the private.13 Muslim elites in the same period, in 
Islamic as well as political organisations, articulated a distinct ‘Indian Muslim’ interest, in 
part based on an evolving understanding of a private sphere defined by Islam and Islamic 
law.  In 1937, the Muslim Personal Law (Shariat) Application Act was passed in India, 
equating Muslim Personal Law with the shari’ah, and defining the domain of ‘personal law’ 
as ‘intestate succession, special property of females, including personal property…marriage, 
dissolution of marriage…maintenance, dower, guardianship, gifts, trusts and trust properties, 
and wakfs.’14 In the 1950s, the Reid Commission, a multi-national group charged with 
drafting the Constitution of the Federation of Malaya, explicitly referred to India and 
Pakistan as models for Malaya, particularly with regard to the legal framing of religion in the 
newly independent state.15 Political elites in Malaya, many of them trained in or familiar with 
British legal framings of Islam in India and the Malay states, drew upon these models as well. 
Debates about the character and composition of the Malaysian state revolved around the 
position of Islam and Muslims, and ended in a constitutional document in which Islam was 
explicitly tied to Malay ethnicity, and Malay ethnicity to a privileged share in the state, as 
articulated in Article 160(2) of the Federal Constitution of Malaysia. 
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GENDER AND JUSTICE IN THE COMMON LAW: MALAYSIAN 
TRANSLATIONS 
 In the moment of founding of the Malaysian state, therefore, Malay ethnicity, Muslim 
religious identity, and the domain of personal law were already co-constitutive, but local 
articulations and elaborations of the law in Malaya and then Malaysia introduced a number of 
important divergences from both India and the British system. The British set up a system of 
indirect rule based upon rule of British Residents in the Malay states, beginning in 1874, 
whose advice the Sultans were to seek in all matters except religion and custom, providing a 
basis for the articulation of Malay ruler autonomy.16 This autonomy was now centred on 
areas not previously the sole jurisdiction of the Sultans, and occasioned the elaboration of 
religion and custom in new ways – the matriarchal and matrilineal practices of some Malay 
communities were increasingly replaced with more patriarchal customs, overlaid with the 
patriarchy of Victorian assumptions about gender, economy and society. In addition to 
changes in the content and practice of custom and religion were changes to their scope and 
symbolic importance – even though religion and custom became increasingly limited to the 
domains of family law, inheritance, child custody and ritual observance, these domains 
became invested with increasing symbolic and performative importance. The position of the 
Malay Sultans as guardians of Malay religion and custom became their protected domain, 
and this protected domain came to be articulated, by the last years of the nineteenth century, 
as the domain of Islam. States such as Johor and Terengganu promulgated constitutions in 
which Islam was proclaimed to be the state religion, the final arbiter of Islam in each state the 
Sultan, and Islam allied to the privilege and political legitimacy of ethnic Malays as the 
indigenous majority in Malaya. State bureaucracies for the administration of Islam were 
developed with these understandings of the jurisdiction of personal status at their core, and 
the majority of cases coming before the shari’ah judges of the Malay peninsula were cases of 
	  8 
divorce, child custody, and maintenance. The family, constituted according to the limited 
domain of Muslim personal status; the shari’ah, constituted according to the limited domain 
of the family: both institutions deeply intertwined with the politics of indigeneity and 
national belonging. 
 By the time of the Reid Commission in the 1950s, the Sultans and Malay nationalist 
groups were able to articulate this position as a matter of constitutional necessity for the 
Federation of Malaya. In addition to tying Islam to the politics of ethnicity and indigeneity in 
Malaysia, constitutional formulations located authority over Islam to the Sultans, making 
Islam an issue over which the Federal government and the states of the Federation would 
continue to struggle. The formulation of Article 160(2) of the Federal Constitution of 1957 
defined a Malay as a person who professes the religion of Islam, habitually speaks the Malay 
language and conforms to Malay custom. We will come to the question of the profession of 
Islam later in this article. The speaking of Malay, given that it is now the national language of 
Malaysia, served far more as a barrier to entry at the beginning of Federation than it does as 
an indicator of Malayness today. What about Malay custom? It is, of course, both a complex 
and problematic thing to define, but here the Nyonya Tahir case provides one window into 
the way that Malay custom was understood by state authorities in the 1980s and 1990s, and 
court documents reveal that the entanglement of ethnicity, religion and gender have been 
negotiated by women in Malaysia well before the constitutional debates. 
 In the Nyonya Tahir case, court documents show that Nyonya Tahir first came to the 
attention of the syariah bureaucracy in 1986, in a report entitled ‘Cohabitation with Chinese 
Man, Nyonya Bt Tahir/Chiang Meng.’17 The Islamic Religious Affairs department and court 
of Alor Gajah Melaka investigated the matter, and issued a report based on an interview with 
Nyonya Tahir. The report began by stating that Tahir was born in 1918, and had lived in the 
village of Ulu Sungai Buluh for fifty years with a Chinese man named Chiang Meng. She 
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was raised by her Malay grandmother, who married a Chinese (from Hainan) convert to 
Islam, and he raised and educated her in the Chinese way. She married a Chinese man with 
the consent of her grandfather when she was 18, and had 13 children. She lived in the 
Chinese way, worshipped Tok Kong (local earth deities) and ate pork.18 The report continued 
to note that she lived in an isolated place with her husband, far from Malay community, that 
she had an altar in her house and venerated it, and that all her children had married Chinese 
people. It concluded that ‘Nyonya Tahir has no intention of returning to Islam and has made 
a declaration that she will continue to live as a Chinese and if she dies wishes to be buried as 
a Chinese person. Her Identity Card is in a Malay name, Nyonya Binte Tahir.’19 The report 
makes no determination of fact or recommendations for action; it seems merely to have 
reported a series of sociological facts based on mixed indicators of race and religion – not 
least of which was her ‘Malay name’, Nyonya, usually used in Malay  referred to a woman of 
Chinese ancestry.  Having spent her life in a small village in the racially diverse state of 
Melaka, Nyonya Tahir appears in this record to have made her way of life and desires clear to 
the Religious Affairs Department, and they appear to have understood her to have 
definitively left Islam and the Malay community.20 The local Islamic bureaucracy seems to 
have been content to leave things as they stood in 1986, and in 1991, Nyonya Tahir signed an 
official declaration repeating the facts of the report before a Melaka Commissioner of Oaths, 
and it was to these documents that the syariah judge referred when deciding after her death in 
2006 that Nyonya Tahir had indeed been apostate. The fact-finding, documentary and 
adjudicative mechanisms of the state all used reasoning that navigated the complex racial, 
religious and cultural landscape of Malaysia to make a determination about Nyonya’s 
religious status.  
 The Lina Joy case, too had a beginning and a documentary trail well preceding its 
appearance in the formal records of the courts. Born to Malay Muslim parents, Azlina Jailani 
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converted to Christianity as an adult and thereafter went to the National Registration 
Department (NRD) in February 1997 to Lina Lelani, stating in her application that she 
wished to marry a Christian.21 The NRD denied her application, and she applied again in 
March 1999, this time to change her name to Lina Joy.  In her suit, Joy claims that she went 
to the branch office of the NRD in Petaling Jaya, and reported that she was advised by an 
employee of the NRD to remove mention of her conversion in her application, which she did, 
and submitted new applications based on this advice in August 1999. She was informed on 
22 October 1999 that her name change application had been approved and that she was to 
apply for a new identity card to reflect her name change, which she submitted on 25 October 
1999, stating her name as Lina Joy, and her religion as Christian. New regulations were 
inserted into the NRD procedures which came into force on October 1 1999 that identity 
cards should, in the case of Muslims, state their religious status. When Lina Joy’s new 
identity card was issued, the card reflected her new name, but indicated that her religion was 
Islam. She returned to the NRD office with her solicitor to apply for ‘Islam’ to be removed 
from her new identity card, and an employee of the NRD refused to accept the application 
because she needed an order from the Syariah Court.  
Joy applied to the federal courts in a series of cases beginning in 2001, and ending 
only in 2007 with the dismissal of her case by the Court of Appeal, first arguing the case on 
grounds of religious freedom as guaranteed by the Malaysian Constitution, and then on 
administrative law grounds, that the NRD acted incorrectly in processing her applications. 
The two defendants, the Islamic Religious Council of the Federal Territories and the National 
Registration Department, argued that since she was Muslim, the civil courts had no 
jurisdiction; Joy argued that, since she was no longer Muslim, but Christian, she was no 
longer subject to the jurisdiction of the Islamic Religious Council or Syariah Courts. The 
2001 decision from the High Court stated: ‘the issue of apostasy is an issue coming under the 
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category of religious affairs...and therefore it ought to be determined by eminent jurists who 
are properly qualified in the field of Islamic jurisprudence and definitely not by the civil 
court.’ (257) However, the constitutional test was ‘Malayness’: ‘a person as long as he/she is 
a Malay and by definition under Art. 160 cl. (2) is a Malay…cannot renounce his/her religion 
at all.’22  In this case, the law on marriage registration, the bureaucracy of the National 
Registration Department, the regulation of national identity cards and the court decisions all 
seemed to be working in unison to enforce a unitary understanding of Malayness and its 
relationship to Islam. 
 
CITATIONAL PRACTICES AND NEW NETWORKS OF LAW  
The proliferation of cases in the area of Islam, constitutional law and jurisdiction have 
provided an opportunity for scholars to look more closely at the ways in which Islamic law is 
being understood and elaborated in Malaysia. Scholars have discussed developments in the 
Malaysian legal system in recent years as charting a trajectory towards greater insistence on 
the Islamic character of the state and increasingly formalistic applications of Islamic legal 
content.23 In 1988, an amendment was passed to the Federal Constitution reserving 
jurisdiction over syariah matters to the state syariah courts, part of political and 
administrative moves by the ruling government to raise the status and prominence of Islam in 
Malaysian public life.24 It was not until the 2000s that these issues became matters of open 
legal contestation and national judicial debate. From 2000 on, in debates about high-profile 
court cases such as those of Lina Joy (2001-2007), Shamala v Jeyaganesh (2004), Kaliammal 
Sinnasamy (2005), Revathi Massosai (2007) and Siti Fatimah Tan Abdullah (2008), that 
general trend has proven strong, and the national political climate and tone of public 
discourse seems in keeping with this analysis.  
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However, the long trajectory of legal reasoning and ruling in Malaysia since 
Independence does not tell a unidirectional story: syariah courts are, under some 
circumstances, permitting Muslims exit from Islam under some circumstances, some with 
penalty and others without; judgements in federal courts, on the other hand, have tended 
consistently to adhere to a strict interpretation of Article 121(1a) of the Constitution 
regarding the jurisdiction of the syariah courts over Muslims, even at the expense of other 
constitutional considerations.  Further examination of the discourses and citations deployed 
in adjudication of cases on the proper jurisdiction over Islam at both the syariah and civil 
courts indicates a number of patterns emerging: while fiercely protective of their jurisdiction 
in cases involving Islam, the syariah courts have also been converging with civil courts in 
their reference to civil law concepts and methods; Muslim judges in the civil courts of the 
Federation undertake varying degrees of Islamic reasoning and proof-texting in even their 
denials of jurisdiction over cases involving Islam; the field of citation for judicial reasoning 
has widened since the 2000s, from a reliance on common law precedents and principles in 
UK and South Asian cases, to broader references to Arab Islamic legal scholarship, US 
constitutional and rights activism language, and beyond. These citations point to the need to 
investigate in more granular detail the thesis of Islamisation in Malaysia, its intellectual and 
legal foundations, and its changing network of references, to the horizons they describe.25 
 The Nyonya Tahir judgement demonstrated, in its references to Malaysian case law 
and constitutional questions, that the syariah court saw itself as participating in a legal 
discourse about the issue of apostasy ranging beyond the confines of Islamic jurisprudence. 
The judge made use of common law terminology, at times in English, indicating increasing 
convergence between the training and professionalisation of members of the syariah judiciary 
in Malaysia with their civil law colleagues.26 By taking the unprecedented step of allowing 
the testimony of Nyonya Tahir’s non-Muslim children in his court, the judge also gave these 
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witnesses standing through the Islamic jurisprudential principle of qarinah, which he defined 
as ‘any matter, whatever matter, that can illuminate the circumstances of something,’27 a 
broad gateway for the inclusion of non-Muslim witnesses. Yet its permissiveness in matters 
in evidence and witnessing was accompanied by a definition of apostasy (riddah) that 
included intention, speech, belief, or ‘words that ridicule,’ citing popular contemporary 
Syrian jurisprudent Wahbah al-Zuhaily.28 He went further to emphasise – surely for 
audiences beyond the court – that the penalty for apostasy was death, in this case citing 
hadith (the authoritative compiled sayings of the Prophet and his early followers) and going 
on to delineate the Qur’anic verses describing consequences after death. 
The Lina Joy judgement, taking place in a different jurisdiction, clearly referred to a 
different set of logics and cases, yet these too delivered a somewhat mixed set of messages. 
Given that the plaintiff’s arguments revolved around provisions in the Constitution for 
religious freedom, the judge paid a significant amount of attention to contextualising the right 
to religious freedom in the Malaysian case. Citing the doctrine of ‘harmonious construction’ 
from M.P. Jain’s Indian Constitutional Law, [1962] the judge argued that this principle 
required reading the provision for religious freedom in light of other constitutional provisions 
regarding the religion of the state and the jurisdiction of the syariah courts over Islam, ‘so as 
to give effect to the intention of the framers of our constitution.’29 By this, the Judge referred 
to the Reid Commission, which he interpreted in the language of  ‘our founding fathers’, as 
having recognised Islam to be the religion of the state in the period of the drafting, and well 
before. ‘Therefore from the inception of the Constitution the religion of Islam has been given 
the special status of being the main and dominant religion of the Federation,’30 and ‘when 
construed harmoniously, the inevitable conclusion is that the freedom to convert out of Islam 
in respect of a Muslim is subject to qualifications, namely the syariah laws on those matters. 
Only such construction would support the ‘smooth workings of the system’, namely the 
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implementation of the syariah law on the Muslims as provided by the constitution.’31 
Similarly to the Nyonya Tahir judgement, the judgement in Lina Joy devoted a reasonably 
significant amount of space to quotations from the Qur’an, on freedom of conscience (2:256, 
29:46, 109:1-6, 2:62, 10:99, 9:6), and then on penalties for unbelief (4:137, 18:29), with little 
commentary to justify their inclusion or break down their significance. 
Having lost the case on constitutional grounds, Lina Joy appealed on administrative 
law grounds, in particular questioning the conduct of the bureaucracy administering the 
provision of identity cards. Her lawyers cited the principle of ‘Wednesbury 
unreasonableness’ (Associated Provincial Picture Houses Ltd v Wednesbury Corporation 
(1947) 2 All ER 680), a standard for judicial review of public authority action ‘so outrageous 
in its defiance of logic or accepted moral standards that no sensible person who had applied 
his mind to the question to be decided could have arrived at it.’32 The test of 
unreasonableness or irrationality according to the Wednesbury decision, made in the UK 
courts in 1947, has since been applied to review the actions of public bodies in Canada, 
Singapore, Malaysia and other common law jurisdictions, but not only have different 
standards for unreasonableness been applied in these jurisdictions, since the 1980s and 1990s, 
the standards for such review in the UK have shifted, in particular to allow judicial review on 
human rights cases.33 The majority judgement at appeal determined that the National 
Registration Department had acted reasonably according to Wednesbury.34 However, a 
dissenting opinion written by Judge Richard Malanjum argued that the constitutional rights 
issues preceded the issue of reasonableness, and that constitutional issues precede 
jurisdictional ones: ‘legislations criminalizing apostasy or limiting the scope of the provisions 
of the fundamental liberties as enshrined in the Constitution are constitutional issues in nature 
which only the civil courts have jurisdiction to determine.’35 Here, the dissenting judge’s 
arguments closely track an evolving discourse in which common law courts around the world 
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are deciding standards for reasonableness in reference to the UK but also according to 
national debates about human rights, constitutional law and the power of the courts to check 
public decisions. 
Cases from Lina Joy (2001) to Siti Fatimah Tan Abdullah (2008) have shown that 
granting state syariah courts sole jurisdiction over Muslims assumes a level of homogeneity 
of Muslim identity and practice that has not historically existed in Malaysia, as the Nyonya 
Tahir documents show.36 Further, in each case – even those involving the conversion of men 
in and out of Islam – the burden appears to rest most heavily on women.37 In both the 
Shamala and Kaliammal cases, the conversion of men into Islam had effects on their non-
Muslim wives: when Jeyaganesh, a Hindu man, converted himself and his young children to 
Islam, the Syariah High Court of the state of Selangor granted him custody of his children; 
when Moorthy Maniam, born a Hindu man, passed away, his wife Kaliammal was denied 
access to his body because he had reportedly converted to Islam. Lina Joy and Revathi, both 
women born into Muslim families, sought to have the state recognise that they did not 
consider themselves to be Muslim, and were refused. In the last case, that of Siti Fatimah Tan 
Abdullah, a woman born Chinese and Buddhist, was allowed by the Penang Syariah High 
Court in 2008 to leave Islam, but only when it was determined that she had converted to 
Islam to marry an Iranian Muslim man who then abandoned her and could not be found. As 
De (2010), Sharafi (2010), Mallampali (2010) and Stilt (2015), among others, have argued, 
conversion provides both courts and litigants numerous opportunities to redefine the law with 
regard to religion and gender; notwithstanding these opportunities, the burdens have seemed 
to fall heavily on women, many of them non-Muslims who would not ordinarily be subject to 
Islamic courts.38 
The division of jurisdiction between state syariah courts and national civil courts has 
an added dimension here, in that with very few exceptions, non-Muslims cannot be 
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recognised in the syariah courts. In the case of Shamala v Jeyaganesh, Shamala contended 
that her children were converted to Islam without her knowledge and consent, and that the 
High Court should declare that conversion (with its implications for custody to the Muslim 
convert father) null and void. The Judge in the case pointed out that the jurisdiction for 
determining this matter was the Syariah Court for the Federal Territories and the relevant law 
Section 92 of the Administration of Islamic Law (Federal Territories Act (1993). ‘However, 
in the present case, the wife is not a Muslim. Being a non-Muslim, she could not take 
advantage of section 92. Being a non-Muslim, the Syariah Court has no jurisdiction to hear 
her. What then is for her to do?’39   
These cases attracted widespread media and public attention at a time when the 
primacy of Islam and Malayness in Malaysia was a matter of open debate and concern. Their 
appearance in the courts, one after another, and their treatment in the media as issues not only 
of human interest but of conflicts of jurisdiction between the syariah and civil courts, 
between the states and the Federation, played a crucial part in raising the problem of Islam 
and ethnic identity when it came to the fate of Muslim women in the Malaysian justice 
system. Scholars such as Norani Othman (2005), Tamir Moustafa (2013) and others have 
observed that the Malaysian legal system itself has diverged in its treatment of laws relating 
to Muslims and non-Muslims, unifying the family codes applied to other ethnic and religious 
communities in 1976 (Marriage and Divorce Act) while concurrently consolidating and 
elaborating a system of laws specifically for Muslims.40 Paradoxically, perhaps, the 
privileging of Malay and Muslim identity over the last few decades in Malaysia has led to 
increasing strictures on Muslims through the law of the states and the Federation, but as the 
list of cases above show, these strictures appear to fall particularly heavily, and 




GENDER, RECOGNITION AND THE PARADOX OF PRIVILEGE 
The discourse of common law, its institutions and authorities, has dominated Malaysian law-
making and development through colonisation and into the moment of founding, and 
continues to play an important role in the formation of concepts such as personal status, and 
of religion itself as located in the private lives of individuals and their families. Yet at the 
moment of founding, a particular relationship between Islam and the Malaysian state and its 
subjects was given primacy in law, through the formulation of Islam as the religion of the 
state, and through the coupling of Malay ethnic identity to Muslim religious identity – a 
coupling unique to Malaysia. This unique relationship has been further elaborated in the 
system of Malaysian courts and their bifurcation, as well as in the language of legislation and 
the work of lawyers, judges and social actors attempting to make sense of contradictions and 
tradeoffs in the law between the equality of citizens and the privileged status of Islam. This 
bifurcation has itself been made visible and relevant through the training, aspirations and 
judicial reasoning of legal institutions and training through which the syariah courts have 
taken on the organisational and educational structures of the civil system, while the civil 
systems have attempted to draw upon the legitimacy and authority of Islamic legal discourse 
and sources. Tensions between the federal government and the states, the ruling party and the 
Sultans, have also fuelled the continuing productivity of jurisdictional disagreements over the 
meaning of Islam vis-à-vis the Malaysian constitution and the scope of the sovereignty of the 
Sultans of each state. Through their language, their chosen audience, and their citations, these 
cases link to a changing landscape in which Malaysian lawyers, judges, scholars and activists 
are attempting to position their arguments, 
Lawyers and judges working to define the scope of protection for rights defined by 
the Malaysian constitution have also invoked a wider universe of citation, primarily from UK 
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sources, but increasingly articulated in language inflected with US rights discourse. We do 
not yet know how upheavals in the educational and judicial institutions of Syria and Egypt 
will affect the networks that have in the past few decades proven so significant for the 
training, authority and upward mobility of judges, lawyers and other actors within the 
Malaysian syariah system. Changes in rights discourse and legal activism emerging from 
British and US politics are also likely to have some impact on the ways in which Malaysian 
lawyers and litigants think and talk about law’s promise, and its pitfalls. An analytic concern 
for citational practices, therefore, also points us to the need to contextualise local and national 
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